Pengaruh Transaksi Pihak Berelasi terhadap Kompensasi Manajemen pada Industri Keuangan di Indonesia

Abstract

Penelitian ini bertujuan membuktikan pengaruh transaksi pihak berelasi terhadap kompensasi manajemen. Sampel penelitian terdiri dari 99 perusahaan keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2018-2020 dengan jumlah observasi 297 firms-years. Kompensasi manajemen diukur menggunakan logaritma natural total kompensasi yang diterima manajemen selama satu tahun. Transaksi pihak berelasi bersifat tunneling diproksikan dengan jumlah transaksi pihak berelasi terkait piutang usaha, piutang lain-lain, dan aset selain piutang usaha yang masing- masing dibandingkan total asetnya. Sedangkan transaksi pihak berelasi bersifat propping diproksikan dengan jumlah transaksi pihak berelasi terkait dengan utang usaha, utang lain-lain, dan liabilitas selain utang usaha yang masing-masing dibandingkan total liabilitasnya. Teknik analisis menggunakan regresi data panel dengan aplikasi eviews 9. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa makin banyak perusahaan melakukan transaksi pihak berelasi terkait piutang usaha dan transaksi pihak berelasi terkait liabilitas selain utang usaha terbukti makin tinggi kompensasi yang diterima oleh dewan direksi maupun dewan komisaris perusahaan. Namun, transaksi pihak berelasi terkait aset selain piutang usaha dan transaksi pihak berelasi liabilitas terkait utang usaha terbukti berpengaruh negatif terhadap kompensasi yang diterima oleh dewan komisaris perusahaan. Pengaruh transaksi pihak berelasi bersifat tunneling terhadap kompensasi dewan direksi dan dewan komisaris ditemukan lebih besar dibandingkan dengan transaksi pihak berelasi bersifat propping.

This study aims to prove the effect of related party transactions on management compensation. The research sample consists of 99 financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2018-2020 period with a total observation of 297 firms-years. Management compensation is measured using the natural logarithm of the total compensation received by management for one year. Tunneling related party transactions are proxied by the number of related party transactions related to trade receivables, other receivables, and assets other than trade receivables, respectively compared to the total assets. Meanwhile, propping related party transactions are proxied by the number of related party transactions related to trade payables, other payables, and liabilities other than trade payables, each of which is compared to the total liabilities. The analysis technique uses panel data regression with the eviews 9 application. The results of the study indicate that the more companies carry out related party transactions related to trade receivables and related party transactions related to liabilities other than trade payables, it is proven that the higher the compensation received by the company's board of directors and board of commissioners. However, related party transactions related to assets other than trade receivables and related party transactions related to liabilities related to trade payables proved to have a negative effect on the compensation received by the company's board of commissioners. The effect of tunneling related party transactions on the compensation of the board of directors and the board of commissioners was found to be greater than that of propping related party transactions.